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Abstract
Background: On November 20, 2016 two novel strains of H5N6 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIVs)
were isolated from three whooper swans (Cygnus cygnus) at Gangjin Bay in South Jeolla province, South Korea.
Identification of HPAIVs in wild birds is significant as there is a potential risk of transmission of these viruses to
poultry and humans.
Results: Phylogenetic analysis revealed that Gangjin H5N6 viruses classified into Asian H5 clade 2.3.4.4 lineage and
were distinguishable from H5N8 and H5N1 HPAIVs previously isolated in Korea. With the exception of the polymerase
acidic (PA) gene, the viruses were most closely related to A/duck/Guangdong/01.01SZSGXJK005-Y/2016 (H5N6) (98.90
~ 99.74%). The PA genes of the two novel Gangjin H5N6 viruses were most closely related to AIV isolates previously
characterized from Korea, A/hooded crane/Korea/1176/2016 (H1N1) (99.16%) and A/environment/Korea/W133/2006
(H7N7) (98.65%). The lack of more recent viruses to A/environment/Korea/W133/2006 (H7N7) indicates the need for
analysis of recent wild bird AIVs isolated in Korea because they might provide further clues as to the origin of these
novel reassortant H5N6 viruses.
Conclusions: Although research on the origins and epidemiology of these infections is ongoing, the most likely route
of infection for the whooper swans was through direct or indirect contact with reassortant viruses shed by migratory
wild birds in Korea. As H5N6 HPAIVs can potentially be transmitted to poultry and humans, continuous monitoring of
AIVs among wild birds will help to mitigate this risk.
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Short report
As a natural reservoir for avian influenza viruses (AIVs),
wild birds do not typically exhibit clinical signs of infec-
tion [1]. In most instances when AIVs of wild-bird origin
are transmitted to poultry, infections are initially mild and
represent a low pathogenic phenotype. Highly pathogenic
AIVs (HPAIVs) arise following adaptation in domestic
poultry, and some strains are known to cause significant
illness or death if transmitted back to wild birds. Infection
by HPAI H5N1 led to the deaths of thousands of wild
birds at Lake Qinghai, western China in 2005 [2], and
infection with HPAI H5N8 killed over a hundred wild
birds of multiple species in the Republic of Korea in
2014/2015 [3].
On 16 November, 2016 the government of South
Korea reported outbreaks of H5N6 HPAI in poultry
farms in South Jeolla province [4]. On 20 November,
2016 one juvenile whooper swan (Cygnus cygnus) exhi-
biting neurological signs including torticollis and ataxia,
along with the carcasses of two adults were found at
Gangjin Bay in South Jeolla. Samples collected from all
three birds were positive for H5 subtype AIV by RT-PCR
[5]. To isolate the viruses, oropharyngeal and cloacal
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swabs, as well as tissue samples (trachea, liver, spleen
and kidney) were inoculated into specific pathogen-free
chicken eggs. Three isolates were identified as H5N6
AIVs by subtyping RT-PCR [6] and the entire genomes
were determined [7]. No other AIV subtypes or Newcastle
disease viruses were detected. The isolates from three
whooper swans were designated as A/whooper swan/
Korea/Gangjin 48/2016 (H5N6) (Gangjin 48, juvenile), A/
whooper swan/Korea/Gangjin 49-1/2016 (H5N6) (Gangjin
49–1, adult) and A/whooper swan/Korea/Gangjin 49-2/
2016(H5N6) (Gangjin 49–2, adult). The sequences of
these isolates were deposited in GenBank with accession
numbers < KY402046-KY402077 > .
The viruses contained conservative residues within the
receptor-binding pocket of the hemagglutinin protein
(HA, including Q226 and G228, H3 numbering), which
is associated with a preference for “avian” type cell sur-
face receptors containing alpha 2,3-sialic acid residues
[8]. The viruses did not contain amino acid substitutions
conferring resistance to adamantane and neuraminidase
(NA) inhibitors [9]. The deduced amino acid sequence
of the HA protease cleavage site contains a series of
basic amino acid residues (LRERRRKR/GLF) characteris-
tic of highly pathogenic AIVs. Experimental infection of
8-week old chickens by intravenous inoculation of the
Gangjin 48 virus resulted in the deaths of all 8 birds
within 25 h, conferring a intravenous pathogenicity
index of 3.0. [5].
Phylogenetic analysis of HA gene sequences from the
three viral isolates classified them within Asian H5 clade
2.3.4.4 lineage (Fig. 1a), which emerged in China during
2010–2011, and unlike earlier clades is known for a novel
A B
Fig. 1 Phylogenetic tree of HA(a) and PA(b) genes of H5N6 viruses isolated from whooper swans. Clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 HPAI isolates in Korea and
Guangdong, Southern China in 2016 are shown in red and green, respectively. Phylogenetic trees were constructed using the maximum-likelihood
algorithm of MEGA 6 with 1,000 bootstrap trials. Other HPAIVs detected in South Korea are indicated in boldface. The numbers at the nodes represent
bootstrap values. The scale bar indicates the nucleotides substitutions per site
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propensity to reassort with NA subtypes other than N1
[10]. The clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 has been the prevalent
lineage in Guangdong, Southern China since 2013 and
spread to northeast China in 2014 [11]. Notably, the vi-
ruses are distinct from both groups A (A/Baikal teal/
Korea/Donglim3/2014) and B (A/breeder duck/Korea/
Gochang1/2014) of the 2.3.4.4 H5N8 viruses, and they are
clearly distinguishable from H5N1 HPAIVs previously
isolated in Korea, including (A/chicken/Korea/ES/2003
(clade 2.5), A/chicken/Korea/IS/2006 (clade 2.2), A/
chicken/Korea/Gimje/2008 (clade 2.3.2.1), and A/mallard/
Korea/1195/2010 (clade 2.3.2.1)) [3].
Nucleotide identity analysis with BioEdit version 7.2.5
(http://bioedit.software.informer.com/) and Clustal Omega
(http://www.ebi.ac.uk/Tools/msa/clustalo/) revealed that all
three viruses were homologous with each other, sharing
99.03 ~ 100% nucleotide identity among seven out of
eight segments (polymerase basic 2 (PB2), polymerase
basic 1 (PB1), HA, nuclear protein (NP), NA, matrix
(M), nonstructural (NS)). The PA subunit segments of
Gangjin 48 and Gangjin 49–2 were identical to each
other but differed (94.05% identity) from Gangjin 49–1,
which suggests that at least two kinds of novel H5N6
HPAIV strains have circulated among wild birds in Korea.
A BLAST (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genomes/FLU/FLU.html)
search and phylogenetic analysis showed that all three
viruses likely originated from A/duck/Guangdong/01.01SZ
SGXJK005-Y/2016 (H5N6, hereafter Guangdong 2016)
(98.90 ~ 99.74% identity) (Fig. 2). The PA genes for Gangjin
48 and Gangjin 49–2 were closely related (99.16% identity)
to A/hooded crane/Korea/1176/2016 (H1N1), while the PA
gene of Gangjin 49–1 was more closely related (98.65%
identity) to A/environment/Korea/W133/2006 (H7N7)
(Fig. 1b). The data does not preclude the possibility that a
as yet unidentified, but more contemporary, virus might be
the actual donor of the PA gene to Gangjin 49–1 (Fig. 1b).
Whooper swans breed in northern Eurasia and winter
in Europe and eastern Asia, including South Korea.
Previous satellite data describing their southern migra-
tion to South Korea indicate the birds follow the Flyway
along inner Mongolia, northeast China and the Korean
peninsula during October and November [12]. Indeed,
on 27 November many migratory bird species including
whooper swans (>1,700), mallards (Anas platyrhynchos,
> 3,500) and spot billed ducks (Ana poecilorhyncha, >
1,500) were observed around Gangjin Bay.
It is possible that whooper swans introduced both
H5N6 viruses into Korea. However, it is also possible that
whooper swans which are highly susceptible to HPAI
H5N1 infection [13], may have been exposed locally
through direct or indirect contact with other H5N6-
infected but asymptomatic migratory species, such as mal-
lards or spot-billed ducks, or perhaps through exposure to
infected poultry [14]. Wild bird species differ in their re-
sponse to HPAIV infection, and it is likely that unidenti-
fied asymptomatically-infected migratory birds could have
introduced an ancestral virus, similar to Guangdong 2016,
into Korea. Moreover, these or other species of wild birds
Fig. 2 Schematic representation of the H5N6 virus strains. The eight gene segments are (indicated by horizontal bars starting from the top) PB2,
PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, M, and NS
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could then play a role in generating novel reassortant
viruses when co-infected with other AIVs. Indeed, our
research group has isolated more than sixty AIVs from
wild birds and waterfowl feces since October 2016
(unpublished data). Genetic analysis of these AIVs
might provide clues as to the origin of these viruses;
the characterization of which will be further detailed in
a subsequent publication.
In conclusion, we have identified the two novel
HPAIV H5N6 strains from three whooper swans in
Korea. Phylogenetic and genetic analyses have shown
that the two strains resulted from reassortment of the
clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 viruses that circulated in Guangdong,
and they are distinguishable from HPAIVs that caused
previous poultry and wild bird outbreaks in Korea. In-
creased understanding of clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 virus trans-
mission and pathogenesis in wild birds would serve to
increase knowledge of the risk these viruses present to
wildlife, domestic animals, and humans. Furthermore, as
the H5N6 HPAIVs are potentially transmissible to poultry
and humans, continuous monitoring of AIVs among wild
birds is warranted.
Abbreviations
AIVs: Avian Influenza Viruses; HA: Hemagglutinin protein; HPAIVs: Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses; M: Matrix protein; NA: Neuraminidase
protein; NP: Nuclear protein; NS: Nonstructural protein; PA: Polymerase Acidic
protein; PB1: Polymerase Basic 1 protein; PB2: Polymerase Basic 2 protein; RT-
PCR: Reverse Transcriptase-Polymerase Chain Reaction
Acknowledgements
We thank the National Institute of Environmental Research (NIER) and the
Ministry of Environment for their efforts in the control of HPAIVs in wild birds.
We thank Dr. David Blehert for helpful comments on this manuscript. Mention
of products does not indicate endorsement by the US Government.
Availability of data and materials
The dataset supporting the conclusions of this article is available in the
Genbank, [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/].
Authors’ contributions
JJ conducted virus identification, genome sequencing, phylogenetic analysis
and drafted the manuscript. CW, IA, YK, KL, SDJ, KS and SL participated in virus
isolation. JKO, SJW, YK, SJ participated in sample collection. JJ, HI, JS and WJ
designed the wild bird surveillance, conducted data analysis and provided final
approval of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
All experiments including chicken infection were approved by the Institutional
Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUC) of National Institute of Environmental
Research (NIER), Inchoen, Korea (IACUC Number: NIER-16-4).
Financial support
This work was supported by National Institute of Environmental Research
(NIER), NIER-2016-01-01-033. The funder had no role in the study design,
data collection and interpretation, or the decision to submit the work for
publication.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.
Author details
1Environmental Health Research Department, National Institute of
Environmental Research, Hwangyeong-ro 42, Seo-gu, Incheon, Republic of
Korea. 2U.S. Geological Survey, National Wildlife Health Center, Madison, WI,
USA.
Received: 4 January 2017 Accepted: 16 March 2017
References
1. Webster RG, Bean WJ, Gorman OT, Chambers TM, Kawaoka Y. Evolution and
ecology of influenza A viruses. Microbiol Rev. 1992;56(1):152–79.
2. Chen H, Smith GJ, Zhang SY, Qin K, Wang J, Li KS, Webster RG, Peiris JS, Guan
Y. Avian flu: H5N1 virus outbreak in migratory waterfowl. Nature. 2005;
436(7048):191–2.
3. Jeong J, Kang HM, Lee EK, Song BM, Kwon YK, Kim HR, Choi KS, Kim JY, Lee
HJ, Moon OK, Jeong W, Choi J, Baek JH, Joo YS, Park YH, Lee HS, Lee YJ.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N8) in domestic poultry and its
relationship with migratory birds in South Korea during 2014. Vet Microbiol.
2014;173(3–4):249–57.
4. World Organization for Animal Health: http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-
in-the-world/update-on-avian-influenza/2016/.
5. World Organization for Animal Health: OIE Terrestrial Manual. 2009. http://
www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Health_standards/tahm/2.03.04_AI.pdf.
6. Fereidouni SR, Starick E, Grund C, Globig A, Mettenleiter TC, Beer M, Harder
T. Rapid molecular subtyping by reverse transcription polymerase chain
reaction of the neuraminidase gene of avian influenza A viruses. Vet
Microbiol. 2009;135(3–4):253–60.
7. Hoffmann E, Stech J, Guan Y, Webster RG, Perez DR. Universal primer set for
the full-length amplification of all influenza A viruses. Arch Virol. 2001;
146(12):2275–89.
8. Stevens J, Blixt O, Tumpey TM, Taubenberger JK, Paulson JC, Wilson IA.
Structure and receptor specificity of the hemagglutinin from an H5N1
influenza virus. Science. 2006;312(5772):404–10.
9. Orozovic G, Orozovic K, Lennerstrand J, Olsen B. Detection of resistance
mutations to antivirals oseltamivir and zanamivir in avian influenza A
viruses isolated from wild birds. PLoS One. 2011;6(1):e16028.
10. Claes F, Morzaria SP, Donis RO. Emergence and dissemination of clade 2.3.4.
4 H5Nx influenza viruses-how is the Asian HPAI H5 lineage maintained. Curr
Opin Virol. 2016;16:158–63.
11. Bi Y, Liu H, Xiong C, Di L, Shi W, Li M, Liu S, Chen J, Chen G, Li Y, Yang G,
Lei Y, Xiong Y, Lei F, Wang H, Chen Q, Chen J, Gao GF. Novel avian
influenza A (H5N6) viruses isolated in migratory waterfowl before the first
human case reported in China, 2014. Sci Rep. 2016;6:29888.
12. Newman SH, Iverson SA, Takekawa JY, Gilbert M, Prosser DJ, Batbayar N,
Natsagdorj T, Douglas DC. Migration of whooper swans and outbreaks of
highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus in eastern Asia. PLoS One.
2009;4(5):e5729.
13. Brown JD, Stallknecht DE, Swayne DE. Experimental infection of swans and
geese with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1) of Asian lineage.
Emerg Infect Dis. 2008;14(1):136–42.
14. Newman SH, Siembieda J, Kock R, McCracken T, Khomenko S, Mundkur T:
Update on highly pathogenic avian influenza in animals (type H5 and H7)
http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/wildlife/index.html. World Organization for
Animal Health 2016.
Jeong et al. Virology Journal  (2017) 14:60 Page 4 of 4
